webslave

That's what I'm getting at. Hell, even a Disney resort would be worth thinking about.

It does beg the question though, although Disneyland is just not viable on Australian shores - is there actually a fit for a Disney outpost in Australia that does fit the market?

Yeah, the two of you ought to keep some distancing from each other... And c'mon, all three of you are gunzels. The clipboard is implied.

TBH I doubt I'm alone in thinking that setup is probably better than the re-imagining of SDSC.

It's that we don't need to see barely-spelled rage at them every time we see your name.

Much as this seems to be your own personal crusade now (we get it), the reality is you can mount that same argument no matter what income the park gets. It's a closed system, and the fine, frankly, is irrelevant in the whole sad tale.

Geez, thank Christ you were able to get it to us so quickly. Imagine not knowing...

This. If he can't cope any time DW/Ardent comes up in conversation he needs to excuse himself. He gets so worked up that his sentences barely string together any more. We get it, you don't like 'em, and you've been affiliated with VRTP to boot. Change the record.

ie; the Federal Government has the shits with the State Government and their ongoing border closure so they aren't going to put money into tourism business when it's closed to the majority of the country.

Yes.

Hi Bikash, Nice to hear from you. Just on this, could you comment on the allegation of @Jdude95 earlier where he said: Is this something that took place? On an unrelated question, was the copy of the promo that was posted to Instagram slowed down, or was that the intended pacing of the spot?

The video is much better when it's sped up:

"Be sustainable; turn the monorail into a walkway" Yeah, right-io mate. Uni students are the future.

I guess what we don't see is what part of the rules require you to be the one enforcing them, Skeet.

I think in time ol' Skeet is going to feel a little lonely out on that limb...

Decent footage.

Yes, that's one thing you can tie it back to, but certainly not the only thing. Organizational arrogance is often a strong contender as a motivator here, for example.

For sure. I'm glad for the most part as an enthusiast community we can have discussions that can go a little deeper than that.

I'd agree @Skeeta, it wouldn't take much talent to figure that out. But they didn't. I think they were all too eager to believe it was the fault of the operator(s) or a "freak accident". One of the things that will have watered down the effectiveness of the talent they did have was the silos the organization allowed them to work in. It's poor culture.

I too would reject the notion that all of this came down to cost-cutting. Instead, the report paints a clear picture of a heavily siloed organization that had very little safety culture, very weak processes, very weak documentation, little oversight from regulators, and a lack of sophisticated enough talent to even realise any of it. There's little evidence in the report that anyone knew of an imminent and likely risk and decided that cutting costs was more important than mitigating it, such was the lack of sophistication in its employ. That's why I think that criminal charges may be a difficult bar to clear.

More modern automated systems would have made the number of people working on it all but irrelevant. Adding more people without better systems is unlikely to have prevented this, though.

You might if you wanted to do it. If it was for safety though, don't you think you might mention it at all?

For a few reasons (my bolding): Where is he saying that the main control panel upgrades are to improve safety? I think the parts I've provided immediately above should answer this for you. Just in case you're unaware, Mr Ritchie was a supervisor in E&T (Electrical) and was a qualified electrician. Is he the guy who you'd think would be concerned with water levels and risk of such? And even if he was, based on the report what confidence do you think I should have in the competence of these people? He's the same guy who felt that just resetting power to the pump drive to fix it was good enough and didn't cause any risk should it cause further faults! On the basis of a statement from him that a pump fault does not constitute a risk how do you justify your belief that he would have concerned himself with monitoring water level? I think the part you're missing here is that this was a proposal to clean up wiring at a main control panel that was a rats nest from an electrician. I've seen no evidence it was ever presented as a safety-critical item, and haven't seen you quote any yet. Do you know of any?

I know the report has that in there, and strictly speaking you're right that it would have prevented this incident, but it doesn't (as you put it) make it such that the entire safety risk is removed. We know from the 2001 incident that water level was not a factor, and accordingly I don't see how anyone could make the case that the water level fixes the safety issue. Assume for a moment that in the year 2000 a water level interlock was installed; would the 2001 incident have occurred? Evidence suggests it would have. If you look at the reference to Tan's email of 13 November 2014 (see paragraph 268) you'll note he describes the problem as allowing rafts to bank up at unload (which makes sense because he's talking about the 2001 incident which didn't involve the water level). What's interesting though is paragraph 269: I think the Coroner might have gotten this wrong. I don't believe Mr Deaves is talking about the Texas incident at all, or at least if he was I don't believe Tan's reply was actually about that. I believe Tan's reply was actually about the Buss incident, which had occurred only a week prior and indeed included the factors he highlighted. What's interesting here is he specifically notes that he stopped and restarted a pump which was against procedure (ie; he's casting that as a negative action) and that stopping the conveyor was something against procedure (ie; he's casting that as a negative action) which presumably was because of the risk of capsize to the raft at the bottom of the conveyor. For reference, he's the low air procedure: Meanwhile, here's the procedure in case you lose a pump: As an aside what's missing from that procedure is the south pump: So, looking at Tan's comments about procedure it's fair to say that Buss stopping a pump was incorrect for the low air scenario. But, at that point when he stopped the conveyor Buss was following procedure... eventually (since he's now doing Shut Down Operation). Restarting the pump was also incorrect. This is a bit of a problem though, because I can see how they will have been more than willing to allow themselves to look solely at the employee not following procedure as the issue rather than examining the rest of it. I didn't find anything in this section that indicated that they saw the risk of running the conveyor when you had a raft trapped at the transition point. Moreover I certainly don't see anything there that would suggest he knew of the risk of operating the conveyor with low water level. The item going in-favour of them knowing of this risk is that in the case of the Shut Down Operation procedure pressing Conveyor Stop sits at item #2 (after the emergency gate preventing accidental dispatch), but as to whether conveyor stop is that high on the list because they know of the risk with low water level versus simply because they want to prevent a bankup at unload (which we actually know they are aware of) is debateable.

I think you'll find mine were phrased pretty similarly, except there were more of mine. Again, I'm not saying that you're wrong here - I'm just saying there's far more to it.