dbo121

Ie if you know the ride. I would not define it in close or a useful proximity.

Seems very logical Joel too otherwise the deckhand should have been trained to hit the button at the actual unload station if it existed. It seems a weak design to place the instant conveyor stop at a distance away from the deckhand operator existed. That distance would take more than 7 seconds to cover alone. I think that there should have been stops for the two operators in their reach and no excuse for that button other than to do an instant cut off for the entire ride. Not just conveyor. This was a big ride with a lot of water so maybe more hesitance and pressure to avoid using though. When we hear from ardent or the engineering auditor some of these things will arise

Higher probaility of operator error because of its manual nature of operation. Not saying it was a death trap. Just higher probability of incidents occurring due to manual error and manual panels. To recreate they did not try to operate over the same period of years of operation. The operators were setup to fail a higher probability of times. Combine that with the capabilities required at a minimum to be hired as a ride operator . An automated system would have reduced the chance of incident .

It is an old ride. Limited automation. a black box for all rides is wishful thinking . What is odd about what I read today is that the operator hit the stop and went to unload . Thought the stop did not engage and went back to hit the button a few more times. Any control operational defects have not been presented or highlighted thus far besides pump failure and hence if the button was pushed in this event why did the operator need to go back as the ride would have shutdown by then. In hindsight a loss of water pressure should have been an automatic shutdown. Best risk practice would involve avoiding human intervention. Getting low paid people with or without a degree of experience to operate these manual machines sometimes can be catastrophic as has occurred . They were setup to fail.

At the unload point

It’s not for them to administer . The nurse or security would be called. Note most people have fire training.

I note the word closest.. don’t disagree with abc but Fairfax !

Are you serious? Media can state one point from some facts but not all the points to make a story . It’s called sensational journalism.

Be careful of believing snippets of information. For example a light on the main control panel illuminated if water pump failed /turned off could have turned on. ( not sure if that is true of false but just using for example of info missed) This may or may not have existed but don’t take one comment via a b grade media producer re scum lines being relied on only without further thought.

Touché. The point I was making the sensor would not stop the raft at certain points. Only start an alarm meaning push button to move raft along. It sounds like this happened every 15 seconds. Which appears not enough given it took 7 seconds for a shutdown. It’s a mute point though. There should have been automated fail safes reducing operator input as per modern rides . Did this ride require a higher level of operator for the main panel (was classified level 4 bracket a decade or so back ) like the log ride because of its manual nature ? Block or water level sensors. All the above could have stopped it without human input. I think our interest in this is fuelled by the tragic losses. My sincere condolences to families in particular involved.

This is an inquest. Prosecutions may follow at another time. At an inquest defendants cannot defend themselves. Will be interesting if that occurs during a potential prosecution unless there are out of court settlements. As for the license yes a workplace and a ride has one. Question there is how to you get one and what are the monitoring/renewal standards etc for theme parks in particular or ride operators. These might need change following inquest outcomes .

Sensor and block sensors are two different types of sensors.

It’s not odd about share price if you believe in market efficiency. My understanding is no block sensors except in unload/load section which were there to alert attendant to push rafts through only.. at least not in the 10 years prior.

This is a very good point. Should only discuss evidence and not conclude. Still my evidence raised was not correct in discussion. If you replaced that with 10 seconds or even less still I am content with my postings for today. Cannot avoid different interpretations though. That’s what makes a conversation .

My statement on 57 seconds was incorrect . No blame was assigned to any party involved except to say many are involved. How that gets weighted well I am not going to speculate. There are a lot of could haves and would haves hence it’s evident that there are multiple factors leading to breakdowns in the system.

did you not read the next three paragraphs? And comprehend my post it’s in entirety..

I have not suggested we can assign blame to one party at moment . Nor that is that the intent of the inquest. It should not be the intent of this forum either. Once the inquest is complete separate civil cases may occur which may weight the responsibility. One thing I have not read is about the underlying rail installation yet. That was new and increased the chances of a raft getting stuck upon water pump failure as well. Live with it just meant the mental scars of being part of it and slim potential to reduce impact. No more.

Yes operators will have to live with knowing that hey had a chance.. no matter how slim that they could have lessened impact of the tragedy. This is not assigning blame to a person or company There are a number of parties responsible. Employers, employees , regulators and government . As per the 57 second time line it sounds plausible that it was when the initial raft was stuck and the collision. The pump failure time would not have been recorded. As for noise we have all been there and know that the 2nd operator could have walked over to main panel in say 5 seconds.

There was a series of errors with the system. Not just one. One issue with ride cannot be highlighted to understand tragedy. Yes the tragedy could have been avoided with the press of a button on either the unload or main panel. The operators had 57 seconds to do that on either panel. Not sure why at least this did not occur on the main panel during this time besides distraction .They will have to live with that unfortunately. Yes if the system was automated in water levels that could have also prevented. Yes if conveyor was not on all the time the tragedy could be prevented . The inquiry is on the system and how to improve process in future. Hard to say anyone is at fault despite ardent not having a better automated system . However, it was allowed to operate in this manner hence workplace qld need to also question what role they had.

Yes increasing visitor numbers and ticket prices would be in their project analysis. On receivership my point is still valid. Borrowing too much with little capital in bad times caused issues. If they did that to fund new rides the same could result. The next owner after receivership came in with a purpose. Inject capital, drive efficiency and sell to make a quick profit hoping someone would buy the park recovery story after some initial cashflow injection. Was never planning to be a long term owner.

Capital is not infinite and needs to be allocated efficiently to maximise shareholder value. If the expected returns do not stack up (cost of project having negative internal rate of return) or lower potential positive irr to other projects in pipeline than it will not get done. Ardent could lever up. That is acceptable to a theoretical point but by doing too much ardent may be more likely to go bust. At this point in time corporates are more likely to take on less new projects and spend less capex. Confidence generally is low. Over time dreamworld has entered recievership a few times so a park running is better than a closed park with a 20m rollercoaster for sale!

Got it thx!

That map makes no sense!

Looks like it?

What is the structure underneath the fibreglass? Is it made of bricks like the imax?