Jdude95

Now just clear all that shit hanging off the roof and throw the on set poles in the bin and they might have something.

I'm not talking about Dreamworld here... I'm talking at the port

Oh, so the importing company waiting to receive these goods don't know what they are talking about either? Fuck you're thick today

Because I have spoken to the company who are currently waiting for these containers to arrive that have been delayed because of the extra quarantine process. You don't have to believe the truth. It's not my fault if you do a dumb and believe whatever you want.

Yes, that still doesn't mean that containers aren't going through extra quarantine processes? Ah yes, how many are there with a non operating steam train that needs to be certified before it can run? Also how many of those require them to be certified by someone who is certified in QLD?

As expected, construction will be ramping up soon as containers would be well and truly on their way by now. The Corona issue is causing some delays with any cargo coming in requiring extra quarantine. When the back end of this cyclone passes, work should commence for bringing down the ToT tracks and new coaster. As for the train, well that's been a work in progress for years. It requires certification. Y'know who certifies steam trains these days? No one.

Woah, Alex said something positive about Dreamworld? Are you okay? Did you get Covid-19?

Wait till they bottom out, buy a couple hundred bucks worth of shares. If it recovers, woo. If not, you didn't lose too much

It's interesting to see how they are painting it in such a random sequence

Pitt and Sherry seemed to fuck so much. I don't even know how they are even certified to do half the shit they do.

wings were modified post TRR so it is harder to get them to spin now. It's possible, just definitely more of a challenge until you're used to it.

I think it might have been @Slick that finally discovered the BB Cafe was the original Hollywood House, albeit modified from it's original form. I can't confirm that though so ultimately, he would be the best person to ask/confirm I'm only tagging him again because it's fun to summon him.

There was a lot of debates around Hollywood House as to what happened to it and where it ended up. After a shittonne of digging, it was discovered that the Big Brother Cafe was part of the original Hollywood House. Changes were made over the years as it was shifted from it's original location to where it is now located in Gold Rush. One could argue that the house is the earliest remnant of Dreamworld.

I think you're thinking about blue boxes

You'll only get tickled by a go away green building

Can confirm, MW wasn't gonna take down the banner so I pulled an REDACTED, scaled the structure and yoinked it Happy?

Not if you stay on here

Can confirm, MW wasn't gonna take down the banner so I pulled an Andrew H, scaled the structure and yoinked it

We are adjourned for the day

Findings have been handed down.

Ride controls were complex, confusing and lacked clear labelling. The safety of the ride was all undertaken at a staff level, no automated safety systems. The south pump tripped multiple times earlier that day. Pump was reset and brought back into operation as it wasn’t investigated further. There was confusion as to how the breakdown policy should apply. Confusion in regards to how many breakdowns would need to occur before a problem is investigated and escalated. Maintenance staff weren’t trained that there were any risks or failures with the ride. There was a significant breakdown in the procedure prior to the incident. Coroner can’t understand why actions weren’t taken earlier in the day as the faults were known and apparent. Training times was dependant on complexity of the ride but seemed inadequate. All training was word of mouth that would be passed from operator to operator. There was a lack of proper training for new ride operators. There was nothing that specified what an emergency was in terms of when to use emergency stop buttons. There were no emergency drills undertaken at the park either. Had this had been done, it might have reduced the stress and improved the response.

Guests in unloading and loading rafts gave evidence that was contradictory to other statements provided. There is no way to tell if and when and how many times the lead operator his the e-stop button on his control panel. The conveyor takes 11 seconds to perform a slow stop which is seen happening after the rafts have already collided. The unload operator didn’t press the e-stop button near her as the lead operator was still in control of his panel and she was not told that the e-stop near here stopped the conveyor. There are 38 checks undertaken by the ride operators which is excessive. There was no training in regards to what checks and tasks took priority. Unload operator was told in a memo to not press unlabelled e-stop at unload platform unless lead operator was incapacitated.

Failure of south pump which caused a drop in water level. Conveyor continued to operate. Ride should not be operated with one pump as per process. There were no alarms or warnings to suggest the water level has changed. There was no automated safety system in place with no audible or visual alert in regards to the water level. It is unknown why the gap between the end of the conveyor and the rails in the troughs was so large. A raft valleyed on the support rails through the station. The spacing of the slats allowed the doomed raft to get pinched and dragged into the conveyor mechanism. Proper record keeping and maintenance would have identified such issues and rectified them. It is unknown why a simple water level sensor was never implemented. It would have been inexpensive and prevented the incident from occurring. The emergency stop buttons were inadequate. Maintenance suggested in early 2016 that a simple one button shut down process should be implemented but it was never put in place. This is contrary to Australian Standards.

The systems in place at Dreamworld were frighteningly unsophisticated. Records in regards to the ride were sparse. This poor record keeping continued through its 30 years or commission. The records that did exist, lacked information. Maintenance records and training were severely lacking. Incident exposed the widespread lack of record keeping over the past 30 years. It is significant that the GM of engineering had no prior knowledge of any incidents that occurred. Shoddy record keeping was a significant reason for this incident.

There is no evidence that Dreamworld ever undertook an engineering risk assessment in the 30 years of the rides operation. A great deal of reliance was placed on Bob Tans expertise. He was not a qualified professional in Queensland and Dreamworld should have been aware of that. Bob Tan being in charge of engineering and maintenance was a clear danger. It is surprising that Bob Tan never recognised the risks posed by TRR. Dreamworld placed heavy reliance on Ride Operators to identify risks. Whilst this information can be valuable. It shouldn’t be the sole source of feedback regarding potential risks. There was no risk reporting in place. There were no safety audits undertaken in regards to the human component of the rides. Departments didn’t talk to eachother and share information across departments. DW Management maintained that they were never aware of such issues as they were never raised.