Jdude95

Well, out of all the counties I could have picked in Asia, I was close.

This is why the bill was introduced to bring in the industrial manslaughter laws. Yes they aren't able to come into play here as it's retrospective but it does ensure the right people are held responsible if something like this were to happen again.

That looks like a mixture of bird shit and worn away paint.

Mark Gordon Maintenance fitter/welder Employed at the park since 2011 Mr Gordon isn’t aware of any risk assessments that has been completed on TRR. Mr Gordon is also aware of the unload e-stop button. Mr Gordon isn’t aware of whether the unload e-stop was ever checked. Mr Gordon advised he didn’t check the air pressure in the rafts as the air pressure gauge wasn’t available. Mr Gordon stated that he would check the air pressure by stepping on the raft tube to get a rough estimate. Pit and Sherry auditors were in the park on the day of the incident. Mr Gordon believes they were inspecting the wipeout on that day. Me Gordon was shown a photo of the control panel and explained that the e-stop button above the control panel would turn off both pumps and shut the station gates to prevent rafts being dispatched. Mr Gordon doesn’t remember this button being tested. Mr Gordon states the e-stop on the unload station shuts off the pumps, conveyors and every component of the ride. Mr Gordon doesn’t believe this button was tested either. Mr Gordon can’t remember any of the e-stop buttons ever being altered to do a different thing. That was the final witness for this part of the inquest. The inquest shall resume for 2 weeks on October 8th and run to the 19th. The inquest will then resume again for another 2 weeks from the 12th-23rd of November. Thank you for joining me for the liveposting. I shall resume when the inquest resumes in October.

John Lossie Senior maintenance team leader Maintenance Electrician. Employees at the park since 2008 Often worked on special projects such as TV’s throughout the park, speakers, wireless receivers. Mr Lossie wasn’t required to train staff but was often called to assist due to his experience. Mr Lossie was often called to assist when his supervisor wasn’t available. Mr Lossie was familiar with park policies and the breakdown procedure. Mr Lossie is retrained in CPR every 12 months. Mr Lossie didn’t have any power to make decisions or changes. Gates were installed at the beginning of the station to prevent further rafts from dispatching if the conveyor has stopped.

Sorry, I got caught up and got to court a little late Peter Gardner Engineering Supervisor Mr Gardner confirmed the ride was built in-house and that if there are any rides with an issue, it should be referred back to the manufacturer but as the ride was built in-house there’s no one to refer back to. Mr Gardner confirmed that e-stops should be labelled. Mr Gardner wasn’t involved with the sensors that was installed at the base of the conveyor. Prior to Mr Gardner’s employment, he believes the motors for the pumps on TRR were upgraded. Mr Gardner is now bringer asked about annual maintenance for TRR. The ride is completely shut down and assessed for any works that need to be complete. If required external contractors could be bought in to ensure the ride meets legislative requirements. An assessment of what is required to bring the ride up to standards is complete prior and during annual maintenance. Preventative maintenance is performed on rides as per requirements from the manufacturer. These assessments and maintenance are completed to assist maintenance staff with figuring out the scope of work required during the annual maintenance. If during annual maintenance, a maintenance team member notices any issues that occur, they will raise that with their supervisor. Mr Gardner confirms spending was available to his department to address safety issues. When a ride is built in-house, all of the components of the ride should have manuals and be referred back to the manufacturer if there are issues. TRR was shut down and de-commissioning began after QPS had commenced their testing in the days after the incident. All the rides and slides were inspected by Pitt and Sherry, an external company, prior to the park reopening after the incident. When the park re-opened, some rides were opened progressively as the external checking and any works required were completed. The checks that were completed inspected every aspect of the ride including the aspheric components. WHS inspectors were regularly onsite to assist and oversee this process along with the maintenance staff and external team. Once these checks were completed by the external company, an international company was then brought in to double check the external companies audits the rides couldn’t be reopened until the external international company had signed off on them. Mr Gardner confirmed that if safety concerns were raised within the maintenance department, it would be send to the supervisors and then sent up the chain from there. Mr Gardner did not assist with previous safety audits prior to the incident, he only acted upon recommendations from those audits. Mr Gardner confirmed that rides should be in line with Australian standards in regards to individual components. The south pump had tripped previously within the week before the incident. Those dates are 19, 22, 23 of October and then twice on the 25th with the third time on the 25th being the time the incident occurred. Mr Gardner confirmed the ride should not have been in service after the second breakdown on the day of the incident. Mr Gardner is unaware if TRR was inspected as part of the Pitt and Sherry review that took place after the incident.

I would assume the DW trainers wouldn't be trained in firearms and would most likely use tranqs. I'm torn between whether they would wait for QPS/Animal handlers with a gun or have a live firearm on site.

Alright everyone, here's todays roundup in a neat, easier to read format as usual. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1efAbeRV7gRoXRkHVhrUkhFAcRe9fpiBlUIFXO3gJnJs/edit?usp=sharing I shall see you all tomorrow for the final day of the first part of the inquest. Then we will pick things back up in October where I'll be back live posting updates from the next chapter in the Dreamworld Inquest.

I'm hoping it would be similar to that Chinese zoo that dresses its empoyees up as animals to practice for an escape scenario.

After the pump had 3-5 issues within the week leading up to the incident, an external electrician was being brought in the day after the incident to inspect the pump. Mr De Villiers was the electrical maintenance engineer who advised the park technicians how to restart the pump on the day of the incident as the electricians were busy in White Water world at the time. The park technicians then had the knowledge to reset the pump by them self. Mr De Villiers has been an electrician since 1992 Mr De Villiers ended his time on the stand by offering his sincerest condolences to the families of the victims. Quentin Dennis Electrical maintenance Been employed since Oct 2008. Outlined his general duties in his role which are the same as the previous electrical maintenance staff. Outlined his knowledge of the park policy and the breakdown procedure which is the same as previous maintenance staff. If a fault occurred on TRR, due to the complex nature of the ride, a supervisor must attend. If there was a fault on TRR an alarm would go off through the park radios alerting maintenance staff and the supervisory team to send all available staff to TRR. Mr Dennis has brought it to the attention of supervisors before about the unsafe and dangerous nature of the wiring in the main control panel. Mr Dennis states that it was brought up often and that the wiring should be labelled. And with that we are adjourned for the day. I shall post the compiled notes later and pick this up tomorrow.

Francoire De Villiers Electrical maintenance Has been employed for 4 years Has worked with the fitter/turners when he started so he could learn the mechanical side of the ride. Mr De Villiers has advised that he wasn’t required to and never tested the e-stop button at the unload station. At around midday on the date of the incident, Mr Villiers was aware of 3 previous times the south pump has tripped in the previous week. The CCTV footage was shown to the court but the court was closed while this took place. I saw the first frame of the paused CCTV footage before it was turned off. That may be the closest we’ll get to any actual vision of the accident. On the control booth wall, there is a hose with a valve on the end which is used to inflate and check the inflation levels of the raft which should be done daily. Upon inspection of the inside of the control panel, the wiring was described as a “rats nest” of tangled, loose wires and wires not being connected to anything. It was described that due to this, the panel could have launched rafts and caused faults on its own without operator input. Mr De Villiers states that there was supposed to be upgraded to the ride prior to the incident that would update the control panel. Photos of the panel were shown and it was a cluster of messy wires.

Mr Wilson had previously reported that the TRR lockout isolator key didn’t isolate the control to the conveyor and it was reported to a supervisor. The response his supervisor gave was “that’s how attractions wanted it” Mr Wilson believed all the the equipment at Dreamworld was in working order. An adjourned for lunch

In the switchboards, it’s common place for them to be hand labelled wither either writing on tape or writing directly onto the switchboard. Mr Wilson states that the labelling “could be better” of the controls in the switchboard and that about 50% of the switchboards are labelled in similar fashion. In the switchboard room, the PLC box has the word “e-stop?” hand written on the inside of the door. Mr Wilson was grilled about the reason for this but isn’t sure of why it would be there. He speculates that it could be there due to a previous technician writing it was a note to himself. Mr Wilson confirmed that there were a few instances throughout the park of notes being written on important equipment.

Mr Wilson confirmed the e-stop button functions and their locations which lines up with the e-stop run down I posted on Tuesday. Mr Wilson did confirm there were 2 lanyard e-stops along the conveyor, one either side. Mr Wilson wasn’t aware of the speed at which the e-stop buttons functioned and is aware that there are two different buttons with different speeds at which they stop the ride but isn’t sure if he was aware of this prior to the 2016 incident. Mr Wilson has previously completed an insulation test and a continuity test on the pump motors.

Mr Wilson has attended TRR due to a pump fault previously and states that it’s a semi regular occurrence. Mr Wilson was shown photos of the control room/switchboard and states that the safety PLC systems were updated in May 2016. Photos from the switchboard show that all the labels are hand written on. Mr Wilson would take a photo of the fault error code on the pump controls for future reference/discussion. Mr Wilson is being shown photos of the switchboard and explaining the functions. I won’t go into details with this as there was no new or interesting information from that walkthrough. Reference pictures would also need to be seen to understand the explanations given by Mr Wilson.

Alright I’m back at the inquest day, liveposting has commenced Jacob Wilson Been working at the park since 2012 Electrical maintenance Performed the park technician role often. Mr Wilson states that the park technicians were stretched thin on a regular basis. Mr Wilson was encouraged to raise any safety concerns with his supervisor. The supervisor would then determine the importance of that concern and address it accordingly. Mr Wilson wasn’t asked to read the breakdown policy often, he read out out of his own curiosity. Mr Wilson has been involved with evacuation scenarios on Buzzsaw and tiger escape scenarios and these took place in 2015 and 2016 prior to the incident but states that these scenarios are practiced within the maintenance department. Mr Wilson also completed first aid/CRP training. New lockout procedures were put in place for every ride prior to the 2016 incident. Mr Wilson was not the park technician on the day of the incident but heard the “code 6” breakdown call and decided to head over there anyway. He states he called extra maintenance staff to assist with the “code 6” as TRR would generally require more staff if the guests had to be evacuated. Previous issues that Mr Wilson has attended the TRR for include the conveyor not moving, water in a sensor, a problem with a jack or a ride op has shut the ride down. The supervisor sent 3 additional maintenance team members with Mr Wilson to attend the TRR breakdown.

The picture wasn't at a high angle so it was hard to tell. The photos were taken from the station area. I'm not sure what caused the first raft to become stuck as it wasn't mentioned when they were discussing it. The general vibe I've been getting from the courtroom is that they are more pointing fingers at people and aren't looking as much into the mechanical and modification side of it. I'm really hoping the focus shifts more towards the mechanical side of things before the inquest is over.

Yes, I saw that photo. I have seen anything that has been shown to the court. It looked exactly how the rafts looked in 2016 with one raft flipped and resting against the other. One of the seatbacks has been slightly torn apart but i'm not sure if that was caused by the conveyor belt or not. In regards to the rails. The photos magician posted are indeed the rails and they run all the way around through the station including that metal platform that the first raft is resting on in the 2016 incident.

Okay everyone, I know I wasn't able to make it today but I have compiled all the notes I took from yesterday and cleaned them up. As I mentioned, Ms Crisp completed a 3 hour walkthrough of the ride with QPS and WHS. 2 hours of this video was shown and i've added into the document some interesting things that I noticed while watching the walkthrough. https://docs.google.com/document/d/1Ayw6_NjtaBHoLiTlSBDNzXoQtiVORt8NTzrVIbsZFzI/edit?usp=sharing

That would be incorrect as I only go on the ABC kids rides with my nephew. I will no longer go on any other DW ride.

It's true. He's not even stalking me and he tracked me down in Dreamworld recently, haha.

HAHAHA! I'm sorry guys. I was having car troubles today and by the time I got it sorted, I would have only got the last hour or two of the day so I figured it wasn't worth the drive. Don't worry, I will be back at the inquest tomorrow and live posting!

So you obviously haven't been keeping up with this thread if seeing a recent video of Scooby is the first you've heard of the theming being removed. It's been the main point of conversation in this thread for the last year at least?

I believe the lanyard e-stop is more used for when the ride begins to move again on the off chance that the impatient guests in the raft decided to stand up or something stupid

The training of Ms Williams was supposed to finish at 11am but it was extended an extra 15 minutes to 11:15am. It’s common for training to be extended as the supervisor/trainer will not leave until they are confident that the trainee is competent and confident in operating the ride. During 2016, the process was changed so that ride ops wouldn’t spend a whole day at a time operating a ride, it was common that they would switch out with another employee and then go to another ride after their lunch break. Ms Crisp states that she may have trained Mr Nameth but he would have been re-trained since then as the process has changed since he was first trained. Any training that is done is achieved by observing other trainers and recommendations from the training coordinator. There are no external teams that train the trainers. Ms Crisp isn’t aware whether the WHS Officer or WHS department had any input on how training was done. Ms Crisp is unsure of whether the lanyard e-stops also shut off the pumps, she was only aware that they definitely shut off the conveyor. In the event of a ride stoppage or a “code 6” the level 3 senior ride operator will take control of the main control panel from the level 2 operator and the level 2 op will travel the catwalk to the bottom of the conveyor to reassure guests that everything is alright and also so that they are right next to the conveyor e-stop lanyard if a guest is acting unsafe in the stopped raft. Court has just adjourned for the day. Thanks for tuning in, I shall return tomorrow to continue.