On 07/06/2018 at 5:26 PM, pushbutton said:

Thanks. Got mine today! 

Works out about 18 cents a day for me. Insanely cheap!

Fool me once, shame on you, fool me twice, shame on me.

36 minutes ago, pushbutton said:

Totally unacceptable. 

Do you think anything has changed since 2016?

Not sounding stupid but the news is blaming the unload station operator? The unload station only ever has 2 buttons and that was to move the raft through the station. Only the load station operator has an e-stop button. So in other words the employee of 2 hours is getting blamed even though she didn’t have a e-stop button?

And to add to the “e-stop topic” the ride would of been due for its 20 strip down just after the accident. Which means it would of had to been bought up to code for 2017 standards not 2007 standards, which would of meant an e-stop button at the unload station and probably gates at the load and unload stations.

27 minutes ago, joel said:

Not sounding stupid but the news is blaming the unload station operator? The unload station only ever has 2 buttons and that was to move the raft through the station. Only the load station operator has an e-stop button. So in other words the employee of 2 hours is getting blamed even though she didn’t have a e-stop button?

???????????????????

"A ride operator in her second week on the job has been revealed as the hero who helped save a child's life on the day of the Dreamworld tragedy".

 

 

1 hour ago, Skeeta said:

Fool me once, shame on you, fool me twice, shame on me.

Do you think anything has changed since 2016?

Not a good topic to joke about.

@pushbutton Who's joking? 

You recently renewed your pass would have knowing what you know now?

Edited June 19, 20187 yr by Skeeta

1 hour ago, Skeeta said:

???????????????????

"A ride operator in her second week on the job has been revealed as the hero who helped save a child's life on the day of the Dreamworld tragedy".

 

 

Why did you post this then? And the news channels and papers are referring it as the new girls problem?

What I posted doesn't say it was operators 2 fault because she didn't press the button.

Can you post what you are reading that says it was operator 2 fault because she didn't press the button @joel

• Operators were told "not to worry about that button (the second e-stop) [because] no one uses it."
• A memo was sent to staff less than a week before the incident advising only to use the second e-stop button if the "main control panel cannot be reached.
•  

Correct me if I'm wrong anybody but I believe most people believe DW crap E-stop setup up caused the issues.  The use of the E-Stop buttons was ambiguous and gave no clear direction on what to do in an emergency.   You should never ask people to make decisions during an emergency.   Don’t forget it would not have got to the situation that a button was needed to be pushed if the ride had a water level sensor or a sensor at the end of the lift hill. 

 

 

 

 

 

There was a series of errors with the system. Not just one. One issue with ride cannot be highlighted to understand tragedy.

Yes the tragedy could have been avoided with the press of a button on either the unload or main panel. The operators had 57 seconds to do that on either panel. Not sure why at least this did not occur on the main panel during this time besides distraction .They will have to live with that unfortunately.

Yes if the system was automated in water levels that could have also prevented.

Yes if conveyor was not on all the time the tragedy could be prevented .

The inquiry is on the system and how to improve process in future. Hard to say anyone is at fault despite ardent not having a better automated system . However, it was allowed to operate in this manner hence workplace qld need to also question what role they had.

 

 

Edited June 19, 20187 yr by dbo121

8 minutes ago, dbo121 said:

Yes the tragedy could have been avoided with the press of a button on either the unload or main panel. The operators had 57 seconds to do that on either panel. Not sure why at least this did not occur on the main panel during this time besides distraction .They will have to live with that unfortunately.

I think that is a very hard line to take, and I would argue - inappropriate at best.

The 57 second timeline, from what I have read, is the time from the pump failure, until the time the raft flipped.

I've seen this style of ride in startup and shutdown, although i've never seen one operating on half it's pumps. I can imagine, given the time it takes the water level to drop in a total shutdown, that the shutdown of only one pump would make the water level drop a much less significant observation.

Basically, with all the water rushing through the station area, guest communications, and mechanical noises, It is doubtful that one pump stopping would be all that noticeable immediately, both from a mechanical noise perspective, as well as a water level perspective AT THE TIME (ie: timeline 0:00)

Also from what we have heard, the main operator panel has no visibility to the unload area, and had no responsibility for that area, which is why there was a separate unload operator. (In later years, Wonderland's snowy could be operated by a single operator using CCTV, with load and unload taking place on either side of the control booth).

It is unfair to be making statements that 'either operator had 57 seconds' to prevent this. Or that they will have to 'live with that'.

Yes, at some point before hand, the water level could have been noticed, the stalled raft at unload could have been noticed - in fact, in both cases, SHOULD Have been noticed - however this doesn't pin it on the operator. For all we've heard so far, Dreamworld's policies, dreamworld's training, and dreamworld's ignorance of previous recommendations brought this about, and in reality, nothing the operators could have done would have saved people by the time it became apparent.

Even the stalled raft may not have appeared 'stuck' but only 'not moving yet' and it may well have been practice on the ride to allow the next raft to 'bump' it along - so even at THAT point, mere seconds before the flip, the unload operator may have not perceived anything wrong, because of the practice of the park's policies.

 

TL:DR - with everything we have heard, it is not appropriate nor fair to pin the loss of these four lives on an operator, or to suggest that they had almost a full minute to perceive and react to save them. The park's culture appears to have taught them that everything was normal, and only when the raft lifted into the air would they have seen a problem worthy of e-stop, which by then would have been too late.

Yes operators will have to live with knowing that hey had a chance.. no matter how slim that they could have lessened impact of the tragedy. 

This is not assigning blame to a person or company There are a number of parties responsible. Employers, employees , regulators and government .

As per the 57 second time line it sounds plausible that it was when the initial raft was stuck and the collision. The pump failure time would not have been recorded. As for noise we have all been there and know that the 2nd operator could have walked over to main panel in say 5 seconds. 

I read somewhere today that the e-stop button was pressed within 5 seconds of the raft tilting. Sounds pretty efficient given the horror and wtf instinct that would immediately cloud every part of your brain. Raft lifting to full stoppage was under 20 seconds due to the 12 second slow down in the conveyer. 

2 minutes ago, dbo121 said:

Yes operators will have to live with knowing that hey had a chance.. no matter how slim that they could have lessened impact of the tragedy. 

This is not assigning blame to a person or company There are a number of parties responsible. Employers, employees , regulators and government .

As per the 57 second time line it sounds plausible that it was when the initial raft was stuck and the collision. The pump failure time would not have been recorded. As for noise we have all been there and know that the 2nd operator could have walked over to main panel in say 5 seconds. 

As Alex said, it was 57 seconds from pump failure to the accident. The raft was absolutely not stopped for 57 seconds.

whilst the operators would still bare the mental scars, they can’t be attributed blame for the failure of their employer to provide a functional safety system that adhered to safety recommendations 

Hang on a minute, you've had second hand information from the tabloid press over a day and a half of evidence-giving in a hearing - but we are already talking in absolutes about who did what, when they did it, what the buttons were set up as, and who is to blame?  Fuck me sideways we are getting ahead of ourselves, aren't we?

15 minutes ago, dbo121 said:

Yes operators will have to live with knowing that hey had a chance.. no matter how slim that they could have lessened impact of the tragedy. 

This is not assigning blame to a person or company There are a number of parties responsible. Employers, employees , regulators and government .

As per the 57 second time line it sounds plausible that it was when the initial raft was stuck and the collision. The pump failure time would not have been recorded. As for noise we have all been there and know that the 2nd operator could have walked over to main panel in say 5 seconds. 

Does your 5 sec included jumping the barrier?

How much of that 15 mins training do you think was spent on how to shut down the ride in an emergency?

 

Not true @webslave We are talking about it as it comes out.  Of course we're not making any final conclusions about it.

 

Edited June 19, 20187 yr by Skeeta

7 minutes ago, Skeeta said:

Not true @webslave We are talking about it as it comes out.  Of course we're not making any final conclusions about it.

When you're talking about people having to "live with it" (as just one example) you're making final conclusions.

I have not suggested we can assign blame to one party at moment . Nor that is that the intent of the inquest. It should not be the intent of this forum either. Once the inquest is complete separate civil cases may occur which may weight the responsibility. 

One thing I have not read is about the underlying rail installation yet. That was new and increased the chances of a raft getting stuck upon water pump failure as well. 

Live with it just meant the mental scars of being part of it and slim potential to reduce impact. No more. 

Edited June 19, 20187 yr by dbo121

1 hour ago, dbo121 said:

There was a series of errors with the system. Not just one. One issue with ride cannot be highlighted to understand tragedy.

Yes the tragedy could have been avoided with the press of a button on either the unload or main panel. The operators had 57 seconds to do that on either panel. Not sure why at least this did not occur on the main panel during this time besides distraction .They will have to live with that unfortunately.

Yes if the system was automated in water levels that could have also prevented.

Yes if conveyor was not on all the time the tragedy could be prevented .

The inquiry is on the system and how to improve process in future. Hard to say anyone is at fault despite ardent not having a better automated system . However, it was allowed to operate in this manner hence workplace qld need to also question what role they had.

 

 

There was no unload panel, just 2 green buttons on 2 different yellow poles, which just open the gates to let the rafts flow by.

5 minutes ago, webslave said:

When you're talking about people having to "live with it" (as just one example) you're making final conclusions.

For the record, that is 1 person who said that.  If you singled them out I would have agreed but your post was open.

 

e-stop buttons can only be pressed once and released when a manger unlocks it. Shouldn’t of been able to push it multiple times!

 

the closest emergency panel is located halfway along the lift, not really near by!

15 minutes ago, dbo121 said:

I have not suggested we can assign blame to one party at moment .

...

Live with it just meant the mental scars of being part of it and slim potential to reduce impact. No more. 

On the contrary:

1 hour ago, dbo121 said:

Yes the tragedy could have been avoided with the press of a button on either the unload or main panel.

The operators had 57 seconds to do that on either panel.

Not sure why at least this did not occur on the main panel during this time besides distraction .

They will have to live with that unfortunately.

I've spaced your statements out for impact, but your allegation was categoric.

1. The tragedy could have been avoided if they pressed the button
2. they had almost a minute to press the button
3. i'm not sure why they didn't press the button in this minute, unless they weren't doing their job properly
4. they have to live with that.

I've refuted your statement on the basis that your assumption of 'almost a minute' is way off base, and also on the basis you assume that there is no conceiveable reason why they wouldn't have pressed the e-stop unless they were distracted.

I've called into question your timeline (it's wrong) as well as the reasons why they didn't (training, policy, not identifying an issue until the last moment - hardly 'distracted').

I'm sure some operators will read these forums. Maybe even those giving evidence. Your statement isn't supported by the evidence and is downright disgusting. I'm sure (given we've heard of self harm incidents) that these people are living with this every day - without anyone suggesting that they were derelict in their duties (simply distracted) and had almost a minute to save these people, when in reality the first real indication for them that something was wrong was probably when the raft lifted out of the water.

13 minutes ago, joel said:

There was no unload panel, just 2 green buttons on 2 different yellow poles, which just open the gates to let the rafts flow by.

Are you an operator with knowledge of the attraction? You've said this twice, and yet we've already heard evidence at the inquest that the unload operator had access to a conveyor belt stop button, which has been referred to as an emergency stop, or '2-second stop' button - which suggests that there was more than just green buttons to left the rafts flow by.

If you're only drawing on publicly accessible images to make your assessments, then please shut up - clearly evidence before the inquest has already discredited you, and you're just making a fool of yourself.

did you not read the next three paragraphs? And comprehend my post it’s in entirety..

Edited June 19, 20187 yr by dbo121

12 minutes ago, joel said:

e-stop buttons can only be pressed once and released when a manger unlocks it. Shouldn’t of been able to push it multiple times!

the closest emergency panel is located halfway along the lift, not really near by!

Ahhh - thankyou. with this additional information it makes a little more sense.

That said, I read nothing into 'pressed multiple times'. A ride operator, who has smacked the mushroom, and sees the ride continue to move will smack it again and again.

Ever been waiting for a lift or a pedestrian crossing, and seen someone press the button multiple times? Do you think that makes it work faster? Of course not - but human nature is to keep pressing the button.

3 minutes ago, dbo121 said:

did you not read the next two paragraphs?

Your additional postulations are irrelevant. We can coulda shoulda woulda all day - the fact is the additional information you included was all academic - the statement that an operator could have stopped the ride and had 57 seconds to do so assumed real, actual events, and laid blame accordingly.

Written word has little nuance. You're new here, so can I respectfully just suggest you think very carefully about how you word something (for example, read my questions to DjRappa on the previous page, and how careful I was to state my questions weren't "real life" applying to this incident), and read very carefully the responses you receive where it is negative... despite your intention, your words placed blame, and did so rather callously.

We're a little community, and everyone here knows somebody with some sort of connection to this incident... be they staff at the park or guests affected by the loss of life.

For people trying to picture the distance from the unload to @joelE-Stop.  I have circled it in red.

 

 

On 18/06/2018 at 1:02 PM, Roachie said:

• The main e-stop button would take seven seconds to stop the ride & the second e-stop button could have shut down the ride in two seconds
• Operators were told "not to worry about that button (the second e-stop) [because] no one uses it."
• A memo was sent to staff less than a week before the incident advising only to use the second e-stop button if the "main control panel cannot be reached" to prevent "false alarms."

 

Everything I read along the lines of the above suggested there was a conveyor stop at the unload point.

If the below is true:

7 minutes ago, Skeeta said:

For people trying to picture the distance from the unload to @joelE-Stop.  I have circled it in red.

 

 

then this is really confusing - that little panel way out there - use that where the main panel can't be reached? that's like saying only touch your letter box if you can't touch your thumb.

on the flip side, if that truly is the 'other' stop button - then it's no wonder operators were told 'nobody uses that'...

My statement on 57 seconds was incorrect .  No blame was assigned to any party involved except to say many are involved. How that gets weighted well I am not going to speculate. There are a lot of could haves and would haves hence it’s evident that there are multiple factors leading to breakdowns in the system. 

 

The other thing to bear in mind here is that what's being presented here is evidence, rather than confirmed statements of fact.