Sorry, I got caught up and got to court a little late
Peter Gardner
Engineering Supervisor
Mr Gardner confirmed the ride was built in-house and that if there are any rides with an issue, it should be referred back to the manufacturer but as the ride was built in-house there’s no one to refer back to.
Mr Gardner confirmed that e-stops should be labelled.
Mr Gardner wasn’t involved with the sensors that was installed at the base of the conveyor.
Prior to Mr Gardner’s employment, he believes the motors for the pumps on TRR were upgraded.
Mr Gardner is now bringer asked about annual maintenance for TRR.
The ride is completely shut down and assessed for any works that need to be complete. If required external contractors could be bought in to ensure the ride meets legislative requirements.
An assessment of what is required to bring the ride up to standards is complete prior and during annual maintenance.
Preventative maintenance is performed on rides as per requirements from the manufacturer. These assessments and maintenance are completed to assist maintenance staff with figuring out the scope of work required during the annual maintenance.
If during annual maintenance, a maintenance team member notices any issues that occur, they will raise that with their supervisor.
Mr Gardner confirms spending was available to his department to address safety issues.
When a ride is built in-house, all of the components of the ride should have manuals and be referred back to the manufacturer if there are issues.
TRR was shut down and de-commissioning began after QPS had commenced their testing in the days after the incident.
All the rides and slides were inspected by Pitt and Sherry, an external company, prior to the park reopening after the incident. When the park re-opened, some rides were opened progressively as the external checking and any works required were completed.
The checks that were completed inspected every aspect of the ride including the aspheric components.
WHS inspectors were regularly onsite to assist and oversee this process along with the maintenance staff and external team.
Once these checks were completed by the external company, an international company was then brought in to double check the external companies audits the rides couldn’t be reopened until the external international company had signed off on them.
Mr Gardner confirmed that if safety concerns were raised within the maintenance department, it would be send to the supervisors and then sent up the chain from there.
Mr Gardner did not assist with previous safety audits prior to the incident, he only acted upon recommendations from those audits.
Mr Gardner confirmed that rides should be in line with Australian standards in regards to individual components.
The south pump had tripped previously within the week before the incident. Those dates are 19, 22, 23 of October and then twice on the 25th with the third time on the 25th being the time the incident occurred.
Mr Gardner confirmed the ride should not have been in service after the second breakdown on the day of the incident.
Mr Gardner is unaware if TRR was inspected as part of the Pitt and Sherry review that took place after the incident.